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POLICING IN PARTNERSHIP: NICARAGUAN POLICIES 
WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICE FORCES 
INTRODUCTION 
In the face of surging regional violence, processes and techniques developed 
by the Nicaraguan National Police yield the lowest violent crime rates in the 
region, in spite of ranking as the poorest country in Central America.1 Bucking 
the trend towards militarization in regional police forces, mirroring U.S. policy,2 
Nicaragua has developed community-centered programs that emphasize 
restorative justice.3 In this endeavor, Nicaragua is harnessing the intent behind 
the traditionally backward-looking goals of transitional justice mechanisms4 and 
deploying these tenets towards a proactive state-security model.5 This concept 
is codified in legislation aimed at prioritizing citizen security through programs 
emphasizing constant reform of security apparatuses in partnership with the 
population.6 Nicaragua’s community-policing techniques, informed by the 
vernacular of transitional justice, are intended to prevent the reoccurrence of 
 
 1 Santiago Ramirez, Inter-American Development Bank [IDB], Violence and Crime in Nicaragua: A 
Country Profile, Discussion Paper, No. IDB-DP-306, 34 (June 2013) (measuring GDP per capita; in terms of 
real GDP Nicaragua ranks second poorest behind Belize). 
 2 This phenomenon has been described as the “(re)production of US-American state sovereignty through 
‘de-territorialized campaigns of public safety’ that are ‘focused on countering territorial contamination and 
transgression—‘terrorist’, demographic and biological infiltration.’” Markus-Michael Müller, Punitive 
Entanglements: The War on Gangs and the Making of a Transnational Penal Apparatus in the Americas, 20 
GEOPOLITICS 696, 697 (2015).  
 3 Yader Prado Reyes, Primera Comisionada Aminta Granera: En Nicaragua el Pueblo es Protagonista 
de su Propia Seguridad, EL 19 (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.el19digital.com/articulos/ver/titulo:46168-primera-
comisionada-aminta-granera-en-nicaragua-el-pueblo-es-protagonista-de-su-propia-seguridad. 
 4 These programs are targeted at preventing the “recurrence of crises and future violations of human 
rights, to ensure social cohesion, nation-building, ownership and inclusiveness at the national and local levels 
and to promote reconciliation.” Pablo de Greiff, Annual Rep. on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation, 
and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/46 (Aug. 9, 2012); see Ruti G. Teitel, 
Transitional Justice in a New Era, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 893 (2002) (describing the backward looking nature 
of traditional transitional justice). Here, Nicaragua has applied the tenets of non-recurrence through constant 
reform aimed at ownership and inclusiveness in the community through partnerships at the policing level. See 
Ley No. 872, 26 June 2014, Ley de Organización, Funciones, Carrera y Régimen Especial de Seguridad Social 
de la Policía Nacional, [Ley de Bienestar y Seguridad Social] [Wellbeing and Social Security Law] tit. I., ch. II., 
Art. VII, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.], 7 July 2014 (Nicar.) [hereinafter Ley No. 872].  
 5 See Ley No. 872, supra note 4.  
 6 See id.  
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violence by addressing root causes7 rather than reacting to them and perpetuating 
cycles of violence.8  
Nicaragua’s experiences have not comported with its neighbors, both 
regionally and globally. In explaining incongruous crime statistics, the Director 
of Nicaragua’s National Police, Aminta Granera, emphasized that her 
department’s greatest strength rests in its commitment to community 
involvement.9 This concept of community involvement is not a uniquely 
Nicaraguan development. The 1990s saw the rise of community policing in the 
United States before gang violence pivoted policy towards the militarization of 
these police forces, a technique then copied by many of Nicaragua’s neighbors.10 
In many ways, Nicaragua’s policies build on the intellectual antecedents of 
American community policing, presenting a new modern form, worthy of 
transfer, that U.S. forces should consider tailoring to their own communities.  
Through an examination of Nicaragua’s community-focused processes and 
techniques, exportable and best practices will be distilled. In order to extract 
uniquely Nicaraguan methods, neighbors’ approaches will be compared, 
highlighting different strategies while distinguishing alternative factors that 
have been proposed as drivers of violence or peace. Once Nicaraguan practices 
have been differentiated from the region, they will be contrasted with those in 
place in U.S. jurisdictions (as it relates to national trends given the lack of a 
national police force). Specific emphasis will center on the prevention of, and 
not the reaction to, crime through cooperation with stakeholders, including but 
not limited to: community members, victims, perpetrators, and the criminal 
justice system with a focus on law enforcement.  
While there are manifold factors contributing to violence in the region, this 
inquiry will focus exclusively on youth gang violence and the processes by 
which Nicaragua confronts this challenge. This study will not delve into the 
 
 7 Mark Ungar & Enrique Desmond Arias, Reassessing Community-Oriented Policing in Latin America, 
22 POLICING SOC’Y 1, 2 (2012). 
 8 This reactionary response to gang violence, as one author suggests, has led to “more powerful and 
brutal” gangs as “all-out war” has led to continued violence at unprecedented levels. José Miguel Cruz, Criminal 
Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the Violent State, 53 LATIN AM. POL. & 
SOC’Y 1, 26 (2011).  
 9 Hannah Stone, Exporting Nicaragua’s Security Model, INSIGHT CRIME (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www. 
insightcrime.org/news-analysis/exporting-nicaraguas-security-model (summarizing her model as one that is 
“preventative, proactive, communitarian, deeply rooted in the heart of the community.”). 
 10 See generally Luis E. Preciado, State Approaches Toward Reducing Youth Violence in Honduras and 
Nicaragua, 3 (2015) (Masters Thesis Naval Postgraduate School). 
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political process other than that which cannot be divorced from police practice.11 
While interdisciplinary scholarship has focused on economics and policies 
underlying narco-trafficking, this Comment will be constrained to the violence 
executed by youth gangs and governmental responses. There will be a further 
emphasis on the frontline community level to address this violence and the 
ensuing effect on its prevalence and subsequent rehabilitation and incarceration 
of individuals involved in its perpetuation. Finally, an emerging topic 
specifically in Nicaragua has been gender-based violence; this category of 
violence is admittedly broad and will not be subjected to a cursory mention when 
it is deserving of its own scholarship. This Comment will not delve into political 
power structures except when necessary to frame youth gang violence within the 
context of its historical and geopolitical reality.  
Part I of this Comment will frame the development of Nicaragua’s policies, 
guided by the overarching aims of transitional justice and shaped by the role of 
youth gang violence. Gangs and their composition will be surveyed to 
understand the impetus behind responses and ensuing outcomes of programs in 
Central America. Against this backdrop, U.S. gang prevalence and responses 
will be surveyed, setting up a foil to the Nicaraguan approach that will be 
subsequently unpacked. Part II will analyze Nicaragua’s specific initiatives, 
exposing best practices that operate independently of historical influences and 
can be distinguished from its neighbors and thus exported. This template, 
predicated on public legitimacy gained through community involvement, 
education, and rehabilitation, will then be extrapolated beyond countries 
transitioning from violence to democracy, specifically U.S. police forces. This 
process will highlight the critical nature of the police-community interaction as 
the “first link in the criminal justice system.”12 While definitions of community-
oriented policing vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, consensus may 
exist at a “fundamental level” once “factors contributing to the divergence of 
definition” have been addressed.13 This entire process will be driven by context, 
as mimetic approaches have exposed the pitfalls of broadly applied yet 
 
 11 Political structure will have to be discussed in the context of Nicaragua and her neighbors to analyze 
the claim that “references to maras and migration have obscured explanations” of violence in the region and the 
disparate levels of violence can be explained by State contributions to violence which is evidenced by their 
“tolerating, encouraging, and even participating in the production of criminal violence.” Cruz, supra note 8, at 
25−26.  
 12 Crime in Latin America: A Broken System, THE ECONOMIST (July 12, 2014), http://www.economist. 
com/news/americas/21606864-citizens-security-regions-biggest-problem-time-improve-criminal-justice-
broken. [hereinafter Crime in Latin America]. 
 13 SUMEDH RAO, GSDRC HELPDESK RESEARCH REPORT: COMMUNITY POLICING IN FRAGILE AND 
CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES 3 (2013), http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq997.pdf. 
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untailored solutions.14 The conclusion section will promote Nicaraguan 
components embodied by four factors: (1) political commitment to reform, (2) 
community involvement, (3) restorative justice through education and 
rehabilitation, and (4) public legitimacy. These factors can then be tailored to 
the U.S. system resulting in a modern definition of community policing 
informed by Nicaragua’s transitional justice experience.  
I. BACKGROUND 
The field of transitional justice provides a framework informing the 
transition from violence to democracy.15 Once truth, justice, and reparations 
have been addressed, the end goal is institutional reform ensuring non-
recurrence;16 however, existing police culture and strained community relations 
have become roadblocks impeding progress before, after, and during these 
transitions.17 This blurring of the boundary between periods of transition and 
normalcy has created tension between traditional transitional justice frameworks 
and steady-state transition.18 This contradiction predicated on the time horizons 
of transition makes local context critical in shaping the outcome and legitimacy 
of the rule of law.19 Nowhere is this paradigm more evident than in Latin 
America, specifically Central America, where a “pervasive weakness in the 
basic institutions of the rule of law” has engendered a marked lack of faith in the 
criminal justice system.20  
This lack of faith in the criminal justice system is warranted, as worldwide 
homicide conviction rates stand at forty-three out of every one hundred murders, 
whereas in Latin America less than half, roughly twenty out of every one 
 
 14 CHARLES M. KATZ & VINCENT J. WEBB, POLICE RESPONSE TO GANGS: A MULTI-SITE STUDY 321 
(2004), https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/cd_rom/solution_gang_crime/pubs/PoliceResponsetoGangs.pdf.  
 15 Ruti Teitel, who coined the term, defines transitional justice as the “conception of justice associated 
with periods of political change.” Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 
(2003).  
 16 Intuitively, to guarantee non-recurrence, constant and responsive reforms would be required to 
encompass a “holistic” approach. de Greiff, supra note 4, ¶ 20.  
 17 RAO, supra note 13 (explaining that “there have been some benefits, though the programmes have not 
been as transformative as hoped” in conflict-affected states, stemming from police culture and community 
relations). 
 18 Teitel, supra note 15, at 93; see also Teitel, supra note 4, at 896 (describing this shift as one that is 
moving away from “judgment” and is being “associated with the more complex and diversely felt necessities of 
State-building in contemporary political circumstances”). 
 19 Teitel, supra note 15, at 93.  
 20 Crime in Latin America, supra note 12 (Examining this breakdown, it is imperative to view transitional 
justice mechanisms through the lens of “the characteristics of the contexts in which they are applied” given the 
reality that they must be “fine-tuned, targeted and sensitive to context.”); de Greiff supra note 4, ¶ 18. 
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hundred, are convicted.21 While the core processes of transitional justice seek 
justice, reparation, truth, and reform, steady-state transition applies these 
concepts to instances of “pervasive conflict.”22 Central American nations may 
not be in the midst of traditional transitional periods; however, institutional 
breakdowns illustrated by gang violence should be addressed within this broader 
concept of “steady-[s]tate” transitional justice.23 This “expanded humanitarian 
discourse” that emerges as a result of the politics of globalization is driven by 
instability begotten by violence.24 As a result, Nicaraguan approaches can be 
seen through the lens of two of the transitional justice processes: constant reform 
targeted at justice in the midst of violence.25  
This systemic breakdown, fueled by violence, has resulted in “internal 
displacement” and “record-level emigration of unaccompanied alien children 
(UAC) and families to the United States.”26 It is this context of violence and 
diaspora that led the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to declare that 
violence, specifically gang violence, has created a “refugee-like” situation.27 
While the specter of traditional war may have yielded to a democratically elected 
government, institutional development continues to indicate that this transitional 
period may not be over, as factors including the “absence of violence,” tracked 
by the Inter-American Development Bank, suggest that Central American 
countries continue to confront systemic problems.28  
As a result, analysis of police-community relations and police culture 
through the lens of transitional justice,29 couched in the discourse of human 
 
 21 Crime in Latin America, supra note 12.  
 22 de Greiff, supra note 4, ¶ 10. The UN Special Rapporteur defines this set of processes as “preventing 
the recurrence of crises and future violations of human rights, to ensure social cohesion, nation-building, 
ownership and inclusiveness at the national and local levels and to promote reconciliation.” Id. ¶ 46; see Teitel, 
supra note 15, at 71−72, 78, 89−90 (describing the post-Cold War transitions as being associated with “diverse 
Nation-building projects” and describing present conditions of ongoing conflict).  
 23 Teitel, supra note 15, at 89−90. 
 24 Id. at 90. 
 25 See de Greiff, supra note 4, ¶ 46. 
 26 CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34112, GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 1 (2016). 
 27 Id.  
 28 Ramirez, supra note 1, at 34. 
 29 de Greiff, supra note 4, ¶ 46 (examining the community policing initiatives through the lens of the 
goals of transitional justice, set out as justice, reparation, truth, and reform (in order to prevent re-occurrence)). 
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rights law,30 provides a pathway for achieving stability and peace.31 Transitional 
justice has been characterized as “backward-looking” in its application to prior 
conflicts,32 but the community policing principles developed by Nicaragua in 
the crucible of steady-state transition provides a template to escape this cycle of 
historical “concepts of justice” through a State-Security model.33 This State-
Security model is predicated on the transitional justice tenet of non-recurrence 
achieved through proactive community engagement by the police force at a local 
level.34 Through its employment of this approach, Nicaragua has emerged as an 
outlier in terms of its crime statistics, which result from policing practices guided 
by both its internal culture and community outreach.35 While developed in an 
evolving transitional period, this methodology should be considered in other 
applications given local gang and community contexts that extend beyond the 
traditional “transitional” period. 
A. The Rise of Youth Gangs 
In Central America, youth gangs,36 like the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 
Barrio 18, are instigators of systemic violence.37 Disagreement exists as to the 
scope of violence attributable to these gangs, with regional estimates ranging 
 
 30 For example, it has been argued that rather than criminalize certain acts coupled with forceful 
responses, institutions would be better served by hewing to U.N. Rights of the Child Convention. JOSÉ LUIS 
ROCHA & DENNIS RODGERS, GANGS OF NICARAGUA 162 (IMPRESIONES HELIOS 1st ed. 2008). In fact, the Mano 
Dura approach in El Salvador was struck down for its violation of the Convention. RODGERS ET AL., GANGS OF 
CENTRAL AMERICA: CASES, COSTS, AND INTERVENTIONS (2009), reprinted in SMALL ARMS SURVEY; 
OCCASIONAL PAPER 23, 12. 
 31 Ramirez, supra note 1, at 34 (the six World Governance Indicators are “political stability/absence of 
violence, control of corruption, regulatory quality, rule of law, government effectiveness, and voice and 
accountability”); see also Rao, supra note 13, at 2 (drawing from case studies in Afghanistan, Kenya, and Sierra 
Leone, the author has found that through these relationships, state legitimacy was strengthened along with trust 
while exposing a series of lessons that are indicative of the challenges which will be highlighted throughout 
Central America). 
 32 Teitel, supra note 4, at 905 (describing this “backwards-looking” approach as one that is “not capable 
of ensuring prospective security”). 
 33 It has been argued that transitional justice principles are not “adequate” in guiding situations 
“addressing the move to politics,” but a post-conflict conception of these principles can provide “needed 
authority” guiding “situations of heightened political fragmentation.” Id.  
 34 Stone, supra note 9.  
 35 Crime in Latin America, supra note 12. 
 36 Youth gangs are defined by members ranging between twelve and twenty-four years of age. Seelke, 
supra note 26, at 1–2.  
 37 Id. at 5–7. “Youth gangs” is the most encompassing term as there is no “universally accepted 
definition” of what constitutes a “gang” amongst law enforcement agencies; therefore, in surveys, agencies are 
asked to identify “a group of youths or young adults in your jurisdiction that you or other responsible persons in 
your agency or community are willing to identify as a ‘gang.’” Also “youth” is not synonymous with “juvenile.” 
National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, NAT’L GANG CTR., https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-
Analysis (last visited Sept. 14, 2017). 
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from 10%-60%.38 Further clouding these numbers is the fact that not all gangs 
are cataloged equally, leading to two distinct classifications in Central America: 
pandillas and maras.39 Grasping the nuanced distinction between these two 
classifications is critical, as the dichotomy has resulted in disparate 
governmental responses driven by societal perceptions.40  
Gang culture in Central American society has entrenched itself as a 
“persistent social phenomenon” constantly evolving from its inception in the 
urban modernization of the 1940s.41 The emergence of modern gangs in the 
region can be traced to the end of the conflicts of the 1990s when former 
guerillas found themselves “facing situations of heightened uncertainty, 
insecurity, and socio-economic flux” upon returning to civilian life.42 These 
former freedom fighters, lacking a clear direction or sense of purpose, founded 
gangs whose structure channeled “traditional organizational vehicle[s] for 
collective youth action.”43 Pandillas represent the historical notion of gangs in 
Central America composed of “localized groups that have long been present in 
the region,” while maras are derived from transnational roots.44 
When interviewing members of pandillas across national lines, a single word 
was used to describe their individual organizations: family.45 This 
characterization is unsurprising given their roots in collective youth action, 
which morphed into “local vigilante style self-defense groups.”46 While it would 
be easy to write pandillas off as remnants of regional conflicts, this would be 
neglecting the reality that pandillas are byproducts of the society in which they 
exist, evolving along with their communities and experiences.47 This community 
dynamic cannot be stressed enough, as it undergirds the Nicaraguan response. 
While still drawing from pandilla culture, the maras combine influences that 
 
 38 RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 1.  
 39 Seelke, supra note 26, at 3.  
 40 The Mano Dura approach rose to prominence as a response to the mara ascendency, while Nicaragua’s 
community-oriented approach is lauded for the very reason that it has excluded mara gangs from its borders. 
Reyes, supra note 3. 
 41 Dennis Rodgers, Nicaragua’s Gangs: Historical Legacy or Contemporary Symptom?, N. AM. CONG. 
ON LATIN AM., https://nacla.org/article/nicaragua%25E2%2580%2599s-gangs-historical-legacy-or-
contemporary-symptom (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).  
 42 RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 6.  
 43 Id.  
 44 Seelke, supra note 26.  
 45 JOSÉ ALBERTO RODRÍGUEZ BOLAÑOS & JORGE SANABRIA LEÓN, DEMOSCOPÍA S.A., MARAS Y 
PANDILLAS, COMUNIDAD Y POLÍCIA EN CENTROAMÉRICA 14 (2007).  
 46 Rodgers, supra note 41, at 2.  
 47 Id.  
RATCHFORD GALLEY_PROOFS2 12/1/2017 10:27 AM 
180 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32 
span local communities and shared societal experiences, leading to their 
disparate treatment.48 
While the origin of the term mara is one that has emerged as a result of 
convoluted and sometimes inconsistent designations, its source can be traced to 
El Salvador.49 Maras brought their violence and culture home with them upon 
their return from abroad rather than forming organically following domestic 
conflict.50 This transnational component has been mapped to the expulsion of 
200,000 individuals who were deported from the United States between 1998 
and 2005, roughly a quarter of whom were convicted criminals.51 Among this 
criminal contingent of deportees were members of the 18th Street Gang, which 
was founded by Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles, that expanded rapidly by 
recruiting Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees.52 The 18th Street gang 
recruited members to fight turf wars with its rival (and also potentially a spin-
off) gang, MS-13.53 As deportees arrived home, their Americanized gang culture 
did not supplant local pandilla culture. Rather, their culture incorporated aspects 
of both traditions, creating the maras, which are now pervasive in the Northern 
Triangle countries (composed of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador).54 This 
transnational component has resulted in the importation of transnational policing 
techniques specifically “inspired—in ideational as well as in practical terms —
by New York City-style zero-tolerance policing.”55 In the eyes of a “growing 
number of observers,” maras have transcended the scope of traditional gangs 
and are seen as a “new urban insurgency.”56 Given this classification, it is not 
surprising that the term “war,” rather than policing, describes state responses to 
maras.57 In spite of this transnational or globalized influence, it has been argued 
 
 48 Id. at 4 (terming their origins as stemming from a “unique transnational development”).  
 49 Anika Oettler, The Central American Fear of Youth, 5 (2) INT’L J. CONFLICT & VIOLENCE, 261, 266 
(2011). 
 50 Rodgers, supra note 41, at 2–3. (It is worth noting that, while Northern Triangle refugees gravitated to 
the West Coast where MS-13 and 18th Street [Barrio 18] were born, Nicaraguan immigrants were concentrated 
in Costa Rica and Miami, which did not suffer from the same gang dynamic). Stone, supra note 9.  
 51 Rodgers, supra note 41, at 2. Following the 1996 passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act, 46,000 convicts were deported for any conviction resulting in a sentence of one 
year or more. RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.  
 52 RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.  
 53 Id. (explaining the origin of the word “MS” [Mara Salvatrucha] as a “combination of salvadoreńo and 
trucha, meaning ‘quick thinking’ or ‘shrewd’ in Salvadoran slang”). 
 54 Rodgers, supra note 41.  
 55 Müller, supra note 2, at 709.  
 56 Id. at 697.  
 57 Id. at 696. 
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that pandillas are actually more representative, globally speaking, of “youth 
gangsterism” than the maras.58  
Focusing on Central America, the State Department has estimated that mara 
membership in the Northern Triangle numbers as high as 85,000,59 while the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has placed that same 
regional number at close to 500,000.60 As a result of this data, within the context 
of violence and diaspora, Central American nations have implemented programs 
to combat both violence and immigration trends, targeting the youth gangs seen 
as a root cause of this “refugee-like” crisis.61 These programs have received 
heightened scrutiny following the passage of a Central America border control 
agreement, enabling the visa-less passage between citizens of Northern Triangle 
countries and their neighbor to the south, Nicaragua.62 It was feared that 
unrestricted flow of individuals would inevitably allow for the movement of 
gang members and the accompanying exportation of violence and displacement 
that had become endemic in the Northern Triangle.63 To date, Nicaragua remains 
mara free.64 
Meanwhile, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have seen spiking 
homicide rates that have oscillated between twenty-four and eighty homicides 
per 100,000 inhabitants over the last decade, with El Salvador’s surging past one 
hundred homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015.65 While academics dispute 
the percentage shares of violence attributable to gangs,66 government responses 
have not suffered from such equivocation.67 These Central American countries 
have adopted some form of reactionary measures in response to what is seen as 
 
 58 Rodgers, supra note 41, at 4 (This distinction potentially makes lessons learned from pandilla 
engagement [i.e. Nicaragua] more widely applicable outside of the region). 
 59 Silva Mathema, They are Refugees: An Increasing Number of People are Fleeing Violence in the 
Northern Triangle, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 
immigration/news/2016/02/24/131645/they-are-refugees-an-increasing-number-of-people-are-fleeing-
violence-in-the-northern-triangle/.  
 60 RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 4. 
 61 Seelke, supra note 26.  
 62 Stone, supra note 9. 
 63 Id.  
 64 Reyes, supra note 3. 
 65 Seelke, supra note 26, at 6; see also Ramirez, supra note 1, at 15 (charting homicide rates in Central 
America between 1996 and 2012); see generally Orlando J. Pérez, Gang Violence and Insecurity in 
Contemporary Central America, BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH 32, 217–34 (2013) (Homicide rates 
are the most reliable indicator of violence given that homicides rarely go unreported). 
 66 RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 1; see also Cruz, supra note 8, at 25 (positing that maras are merely 
“scapegoats for insecurity and justified draconian state responses,” shifting the burden of violence from gangs 
to state actors).  
 67 ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 179.  
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a “destabilizing menace, more immediate than any conventional or guerilla 
war.”68 However, their efforts have not yielded Nicaragua’s results.69 Further, 
Northern Triangle policies mirror U.S. techniques, presenting a regional 
analogue that enables comparison of policies within the region for analysis 
outside of its borders.70 
Gang violence is not purely a Central American problem; between 2009 and 
2012, gangs in the United States added 400,000 members to their roles, an 
increase of forty percent.71 This statistic is of particular importance given that 
these gangs are responsible for an average of forty-eight percent of violent crime 
and up to ninety percent in some jurisdictions.72 Further, MS-13 and the 18th 
Street Gang are expanding faster than other national gangs, and, given their 
“transnational” component, U.S. responses have focused not only at home but 
also abroad.73 The Mérida Initiative, “the largest multi-year U.S. foreign aid and 
security package,” prioritized the gang problem by naming it one of its four 
pillars.74 Critics have described this approach as constituting the “[re]production 
of US-American state sovereignty . . . ‘focused on countering territorial 
contamination and transgression;’” however, examining statistics both at home 
and abroad demonstrates that this approach is not producing the intended results 
and space exists for an alternative approach.75  
B. U.S. Police Culture in Context of Gang Violence 
In the United States, the concept of community-oriented policing rose to 
prominence in the 1990s and was characterized by the development of a close 
working relationship between community members and police officers.76 This 
response was one of several stimulated by 200 distinct recommendations in a 
report compiled by commissioners selected by President Johnson, who were 
 
 68 Id. This characterization emerged during a regional summit of heads of Central American states. Id. at 
180. 
 69 RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 4 (“These qualitative studies also highlight the fact that there is great 
diversity among countries in the region. At this writing, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are clearly 
experiencing much greater levels of gang violence than Costa Rica and Nicaragua.”).  
 70 See generally Müller, supra note 2, at 709–10.  
 71 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-
national-gang-threat-assessment (last visited Sept. 14, 2017). 
 72 Id.  
 73 Müller, supra note 2, at 715.  
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. Violence statistics in countries containing maras have in fact risen significantly since 2007. See 
Seelke, supra note 26, at 1, 14; 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment, supra note 71.  
 76 Ungar & Arias, supra note 7 (discussing the origins of community-oriented policing as it was exported 
to Latin America). 
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charged with investigating the state of Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice in America.77 Community-oriented policing was, in part, a legacy of 
problem-oriented policing (POP), a direct result of the commission’s report that 
shaped a new organizational structure termed the Professional Model.78 Acting 
within the constraints of this professionalization, community-oriented policing 
emphasized patrolling and interacting with the community in order to 
proactively police these communities, as opposed to focusing on reacting to 
crimes after they had occurred.79 Community policing identified that it was the 
general fear of being bothered by disorderly actors that enabled police visibility 
to elevate the perceived level of public order.80 However, these interactions with 
and within the community will only function with community buy-in; otherwise, 
patrols simply produce presence, not results.81 The community must perceive 
the intent of police behavior as being driven by a sense of community 
cooperation to address jointly identified problems and not by the threat of 
punishment.82 While these concepts were being introduced in police forces 
across the United States, extrinsic factors led to legislation that shifted police 
strategies in order to deal with new realities.  
California, in response to the nationally televised Rodney King riots, led the 
way in 1992 with the implementation of strict measures meant to crack down on 
gang violence.83 A signature provision in this legislation granted prosecutors the 
ability to charge minors as adults, resulting in prison terms for hundreds of 
 
 77 Nicholas de Katzenbach et al., Foreword to THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, A REPORT 
BY THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1967) 
(intending to understand more “about those who commit, about those who are its victims, and about what can 
be done to reduce it” to create a “safer and more just society”). 
 78 The Professional Model was characterized by updating departments and reorganizing them according 
to a rigid hierarchical structure which was characterized by three tactics: “(1) Motorized patrol, (2) rapid 
response to calls for service, and (3) retrospective investigation of crimes.” Mark Moore, Robert Trojanowicz & 
George Kelling, Crime and Policing, NAT’L INST. JUST. (1988).  
 79 Ungar & Arias, supra note 7. Problem-oriented policing on the other hand simply sought feedback 
from citizens in order to “help them identify and solve problems in their own communities,” a backward-looking 
approach that was confronted by community policing. Moore, Trojanowicz & Kelling supra note 78, at 3. 
 80 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows; The Police and Neighborhood Safety, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 29, 32 (1982) (Interestingly, in 1982, data did not support the concept of community-
oriented policing as an effective way of cutting street crime as harm was not equated with fear but rather 
disorder). 
 81 Tom Tyler, The Paradox of American Policing: Performance without Legitimacy, DISPATCH, July 
2010, http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/July_2010/AmericanPolicing.asp. 
 82 This legitimacy can only be developed when it is the “fairness of police behavior–not the fear of police 
force and the threat of punishment–[that] creates legitimacy, and through it drives public actions.” Id.  
 83 These riots “heavily involved” both the 18th Street Gang and the Mara Salavatrucha and were part of 
the impetus behind the passing of these toughened laws. RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.  
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underage members of mara gangs.84 This cohort would form part of the nearly 
200,000 individuals who were deported as a result of the congressional passage 
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.85 
The implementation of this legislation prompted an analogous national trend in 
police culture.  
A corresponding movement towards the militarization of police forces, 
paralleling these stricter laws, became a key component of zero-tolerance 
policing.86 In order to enforce this type of mandate, there was a greater emphasis 
on—or in some cases, the creation of—police paramilitary units (PPUs) and 
SWAT teams.87 Police forces that had been associated with a community 
policing model implemented these militarized components that were 
irreconcilable with a community-oriented approach.88 This disconnect was 
further reinforced within these departments by creating specialized gang units 
whose focus was reactionary, eschewing traditional community- and problem-
oriented policing practices.89 The centralized gang unit response, as it currently 
functions, is incompatible with community policing given its emphasis on 
decentralization and lack of community involvement.90 Based on multi-site 
studies, when gang officers do partner with the community, their singular goal 
is to access information, not the “co-production of public safety.”91 This 
contradiction, created by gang units within departments committed to 
community policing, can only be understood in the context of abstract and 
inclusive definitions extended to modern community-oriented policing.92 Given 
this ambiguity and these divergent concepts across jurisdictions,93 a space exists 
both abroad and at home to determine the essential nature of these various 
 
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. at 6. This was the same group that would form the transnational component of the mara gangs in 
the Northern Triangle. Rodgers, supra note 41, at 2.  
 86 MATTHEW T. DEMICHELE & PETER B. KRASKA, Community Policing in Battle Garb, in MILITARIZING 
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE 82, 
88–89 (Peter B. Kraska ed., UPNE 2001). 
 87 Id. at 83. 
 88 Id. at 88–89. 
 89 KATZ & WEBB, supra note 14, at 321. Anecdotally, a precinct lieutenant described his gang unit’s use 
of community policing as follows: “[Y]es, from a standpoint that there is liaison and they are dealing with the 
internal customers, mainly patrol officers, yes. No, from the standpoint that they are not solving problems long 
term, they are solving them short term . . . the short-term reactionary issues.” Id. at 424.  
 90 Id. at 396.  
 91 Id. at 475.  
 92 For example, broad-ranging definitions of community-oriented policing models have described 
portions of the Professional Model, the “broken windows” approach, and even a “governmentality” approach. 
See generally DEMICHELE & KRASKA, supra note 86.  
 93 See generally id.  
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programs as they are informed by the goals of transitional justice exemplified 
by Nicaragua’s approach. 
C. Regional Responses to Gang Violence 
One of the more prevalent approaches in Central America employs “mano 
dura” (directly translated as “heavy hand”), which has become the catch-all term 
for militarized approaches aimed at addressing the surging violence in the 
region.94 These approaches are intended to deter “anti-social behaviors” in 
specific neighborhoods through the use of what can only be called “aggressive 
tactics.”95 These approaches track the U.S. concept of zero-tolerance policing 
and provide a counterpoint to the Nicaraguan model, notwithstanding that their 
histories reflect many of the same transitional antecedents Nicaragua 
experienced.96  
In El Salvador, where there were nine murders per day by 2014,97 these 
strategies resulted in 2,438 arrests just for having signature gang tattoos and 
wearing particular clothing styles.98 This crackdown stemmed from the 
criminalization of petty crimes and social disobedience, signaling the 
commitment of El Salvador to purging themselves of the maras.99 The 
seriousness of the government’s intent was reinforced by the operations’ 
assignment to military units rather than the police force.100 Further cementing its 
commitment to militarization, El Salvador introduced Operation New Dawn in 
2009, officially assigning forty percent of its military force to public security 
matters.101 This delegation of traditional police operations to the military was 
not unique to El Salvador. Guatemala codified the role of their military in police 
 
 94 Preciado, supra note 10; see also José Miguel Cruz, The Root Causes of the Central American Crisis, 
114 CURRENT HISTORY, Feb. 2015, at 43, 47 [hereinafter “The Root Causes”]. Other program names demonstrate 
the same commitment to repression as evidenced by “the Broom Plan, the Zero Tolerance Plan, the Hard Hand 
Plan and the Super Hard Hand Plan.” ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 162. 
 95 Oettler, supra note 49, at 273; see Müller supra note 2, at 712 (describing the analogous “tough on 
crime approach” imported from the United States).  
 96 DEMICHELE & KRASKA, supra note 86, at 84; see, e.g., Müller, supra note 2, at 705, 709 (describing 
civil gang injunctions in the U.S. which closely track the “anti-social behaviors” targeted by Northern Triangle 
governments).  
 97 Seelke, supra note 26. 
 98 Oettler, supra note 49, at 261. These arrests were short lived as the original mano dura plan was struck 
down in El Salvador for violating UN Rights of the Child conventions. ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30.  
 99 Preciado, supra note 10, at 3–4.  
 100 Id.  
 101 Matt Budd, Countering Militarised Public Security in Latin America: Lessons from Nicaragua, 
SUSTAINABLE SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2013), https://sustainablesecurity.org/2013/11/12/community-policing-in-
nicaragua/.  
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action through the Protocol for Inter-institutional Action.102 Honduras 
emphasized this entwinement of their military and police forces in the public 
security domain by vesting police authority in the Ministry of Defense, 
establishing the Military Police of Public Order.103 Nicaragua, on the other hand, 
implemented a different community-centered approach. 
D. Nicaragua’s Approach To Gang Violence: In Context of National Police 
In order to understand the distinct police culture and the relationship with 
the community, it is imperative to place the analysis of Nicaraguan programs in 
the context of its history.104 This history, like that of its neighbors, is riddled 
with transitions between governments facilitated by violence, yet did not result 
in the implementation of mano dura methods. Following nearly two decades of 
civil war, a peace agreement was negotiated in 1990 between the Sandinistas 
and the Contras.105 Armed gangs emerged from the ranks of both sides following 
the ceasefire.106  
These pandillas formed a natural extension for returning soldiers as it 
provided the opportunity to continue “serving and protecting friends, families, 
and local communities in a post-war context marked by heightened political 
polarization and spiraling insecurity.”107 Pandillas traced their roots to this 
context of security and neighborhood order.108 The first part of the 2000s, 
however, shifted their focus from providing security and order to illicit dealings 
that traded on the cachet of threats and violence.109 This development can be 
understood through the broader lens of Nicaragua’s transformation to a 
neoliberal economic model in which a cohort of young Nicaraguans lacking 
education or trade skills found themselves unemployed, as sectors that 
traditionally had required labor-intensive work were modernized.110 While the 
 
 102 Id. In this capacity, 4,000 soldiers were deployed in “troubled neighborhoods in Guatemala City.” 
ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 178.  
 103 Budd, supra note 101. “This collaboration extended to joint urban patrolling, sometimes even using 
tanks.” ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 178.  
 104 As Ralph Waldo Emerson opined, all history is subjective in the mind of each individual; but, by 
placing facts in context, we can attempt to understand the development of the Nicaraguan security apparatus. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Collected Essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson, History, EASTON PRESS 5 (1962). 
 105 Preciado, supra note 10, at 44.  
 106 Id. at 45.  
 107 Rodgers, supra note 41, at 3 (internal quotations omitted). 
 108 Id.  
 109 Id. This shift mirrors the violence endemic in mara dominated Northern Triangle countries. Seelke, 
supra note 26, at 6.  
 110 Rodgers, supra note 41, at 3. This dearth of available jobs pushed this younger generation into gangs 
which lacked the soldiering background that pandillas drew from following the peace accords in 1990. Id. This 
RATCHFORD GALLEY_PROOFS2 12/1/2017 10:27 AM 
2017] POLICING IN PARTNERSHIP 187 
pandillas were transforming, the Nicaraguan National Police was developing 
responses geared towards the realities of this new status quo.  
The Nicaraguan National Police traces its origins to the 1979 Fundamental 
Statute of the Republic (FSLN), which created the first security institution 
distinct from the Army following the Sandinista transition from the Somoza 
dictatorship.111 Internal, as well as international political pressure following the 
end of hostilities between the Sandinistas and the Contras, forced the National 
Police to move beyond its origins in the Sandinista revolution.112 In order to 
break with this tradition rooted in the Sandinista party structure, the Organic 
Law of 1996 was implemented, which reformulated the institution and 
“guaranteed a non-partisan nature.”113 Following this rebranding, the National 
Police underwent a series of five-year plans, constantly reshaping and adapting 
its structure.114 
Throughout this continuous transformation, Nicaragua’s police force has 
remained the least funded force in the Northern Triangle.115 Paradoxically, this 
police force is, in the words of its director, “the smallest police force in Central 
America, with the lowest salaries, but with the best results of any in the 
region.”116 There are a number of metrics that support this assertion. For 
example, the most recent numbers available place Nicaragua’s homicide rates at 
eight per 100,000 inhabitants, the lowest such statistic in the region.117 Another 
indicator, which can be related more directly to youth gangs, is the shocking 
 
economic insecurity is often mentioned in the U.S. context, where, in response to drivers of gang affiliation, one 
gang officer perceived that “[p]art of that, I’m sure, is socio-economic.” KATZ & WEBB, supra note 14, at 321.  
 111 Ramirez, supra note 1, at 32.  
 112 This is indicative of the underlying trend of constant reform. Id. at 34 (This pressure “to eliminate its 
historic links to the FSLN” was the catalyst that spurred the definition of the force’s “institutional purpose.”). 
 113 Id. While the non-partisan nature of the police force is touted following the enactment of the 1996 law, 
Director Granera was previously Chief of Staff for the Interior Ministry during the first Sandinista regime and 
credits her decision to participate in the new force as one made after deciding “not [to] hand[] my rifle over to 
someone who will use it against my people.” Id. Additionally, the strengthening of security institutions has been 
attributed to the Sandinistas following the transition in order to “legitimate” their role post-1990. Cruz, supra 
note 8, at 25.  
 114 Seelke, supra note 26, at 13; See POLICÍA NACIONAL, SISTEMATIZACIÓN DEL MODELO POLICIAL 
COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO DE NICARAGUA, 38 (2011). [hereinafter MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO 
PROACTIVO]. 
 115 The Root Causes, supra note 94, at 47. 
 116 Tim Johnson, Nicaragua’s Top Cop, Who Once Wanted to Be a Nun, Fends Off Drug Gangs, 
MCCLATCHEY HYDE DC (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article 
24718984.html.  
 117 Reyes, supra note 3 (other indicators of security are also analyzed in this Comment). 
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statistic that in a country of over six million inhabitants there are only seventy 
juveniles in custody.118  
Nicaraguan results represent a marked departure from those stemming from 
mano dura techniques employed in Northern Triangle countries and in 
analogous forms in the United States. The foregoing analysis will distinguish 
unique features of Nicaragua’s juvenile justice program that relies on: (1) 
political commitment to reform, (2) community involvement, (3) restorative 
justice through education and rehabilitation, and (4) public legitimacy. The 
Nicaraguan approach will be sharpened by the counterpoint provided by U.S. 
and regional responses to gang problems. These best practices are exportable, 
and U.S. policies should be tailored to these practices, resulting in a return to the 
historical concept of community policing.  
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
While the United States may have developed modern community-oriented 
policing strategies, Nicaragua created a version adapted to its own specific needs 
that continues to be shaped by constant reform targeted at non-recurrence.119 
This process is anything but stagnant and requires political commitment to 
continuous reform.120 Confronted with the ambiguous and seemingly 
paradoxical application of community-oriented policing models worldwide, 
Nicaragua’s practices have the potential to inform a broader understanding of 
community-oriented policing. The lessons learned from this period of transition 
should not be confined to situations defined by transition but rather to any 
community that would benefit from the implementation of similar programs 
tailored to their specific situations on the ground. This application provides 
timely knowledge that should inform practices in the United States where social 
action groups have advanced the argument that “militarization of police 
departments further erodes the trust that should exist between residents and the 
police,” highlighting a disconnect between citizens and their police forces.121 
 
 118 Eyder Peralta, With a Soft Approach on Gangs, Nicaragua Eschews Violence, NPR (Oct. 28, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/10/28/359612148/with-a-soft-approach-on-gangs-nicaragua-
eschews-violence. Programs that may influence this number will be discussed in greater depth in the analysis of 
Nicaragua’s programs, specifically those of their Juvenile Affairs division. Seelke, supra note 26, at 13. This 
division “runs at least two anti-gang activities a month,” which focus on preventative and rehabilitative 
techniques through involvement in “family, school and community interventions.” Id. 
 119 This continuous process can be seen through the implementation of successive five-year plans in an 
effort to constantly improve best practices and adapt to realties of changing dynamics. Seelke, supra note 26, at 
13; See also MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO supra note 114, at 38.  
 120 See generally Seelke, supra note 26, at 13 (describing successive five-year plans).  
 121 Tyler, supra note 81.  
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The term “community policing” is inherently subjective, holding different 
meanings for each jurisdiction shaped by local conditions and relationships.122 
For the purposes of this Section, it will refer to its most basic concept—“policing 
in partnership with the community.”123 While violence in Central America is 
undoubtedly the product of many factors,124 the culture of Nicaragua’s National 
Police and its engagement and partnership with the community, codified as a 
result of political commitment to reform, is a distinct practice.125 In Nicaragua, 
security gains targeted at addressing problems stemming from pandillas have 
simultaneously precluded the importation of mara violence endemic in the 
Northern Triangle.126  
While programs like mano dura are overwhelmingly popular with their 
corresponding populations, human rights abuses identified by the U.S. State 
Department and violations of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC),127 compounded by a lack of reduction in rates of violence, point to a 
need for an alternative approach.128 The United States is facing a similar problem 
compounded by social perceptions that stem from a lack of trust between the 
community and its officers.129 The militarization of police forces typified by 
mano dura approaches has not provided answers to these dilemmas. Similarly, 
the CRC only provides standards that signatories agree not to violate but does 
not provide avenues through which to protect their populations while 
simultaneously protecting the rights established by the convention.130 One 
solution operating within the constraints of the convention can be illustrated by 
the Nicaraguan approach through “inclusive and cooperative processes.”131 
These processes can be understood in the context of their four key components: 
 
 122 For an overview of different uses of the term “community policing” within different State applications, 
see RAO, supra note 13, at 1–6. 
 123 Id. at 1.  
 124 Cruz, supra note 8, at 25.  
 125 Crime in Latin America, supra note 12. 
 126 Stone, supra note 9. 
 127 ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 178–79 (describing the striking down of Salvadoran approaches 
in contravention of the CRC).  
 128 In the years following the implementation of these approaches, there was actually a spike in violence, 
leading to the theory that it was, in fact, State-sponsored violence, which begat more violence while also 
obfuscating the State’s role in the violence itself. Cruz, supra note 8, at 25–26. 
 129 Tyler, supra note 81.  
 130 See generally National Juvenile Justice Network [NJJN], The Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Implications for Juvenile Justice Reform, Fact Sheet, at 2 (Mar. 2010).  
 131 Sarah Westerlund & Marlene Widenbladh, The Rural Judicial Facilitators Program in Nicaragua–an 
Exemplary Model of Restorative Justice?, MFS-report No. 43, UMEÅ UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF LAW, p. 
14. (Mar. 3, 2007). 
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(1) political commitment to reform, (2) community involvement, (3) restorative 
justice through education and rehabilitation, and (4) public legitimacy. 
A. A Softer Approach 
Rather than mano dura, Nicaraguan programs have taken a less combative 
approach,132 which is reflected even in the branding of their programs. Names 
include the “Bethlehem Plan” and the “Beach Plan.”133 Rather than 
criminalizing behaviors that resulted in the mass incarceration of youth gang 
members134 in contravention of the CRC,135 Nicaragua has taken a restorative 
approach to juvenile justice.136 This is not a “soft form of justice” offering 
impunity to the perpetrators of violence, but rather a constant reform of an 
institution, guided by transitional justice mechanisms in the hopes of 
perpetuating justice by preventing recurrences of violence.137 This approach is 
characterized by community engagement informed by efforts targeted at non-
recurrence achieved through institutional reform.138 These measures are 
promulgated by a clear and continuous political commitment to reform.139 These 
reforms prioritize community involvement, providing for the implementation of 
restorative justice programs that confer public legitimacy.140 This approach is 
reflected in the development of the Nicaraguan National Police’s youth 
programs. The National Police breaks its initiatives into four distinct time 
periods: (1) 1970-1998, (2) the mid-1990s, (3) 1999-2003, and (4) post-2004.141  
During the first period, the Nicaraguan assembly promulgated the “Ley 
Tutelar de Menores” regulating the relationship between youth, their families, 
 
 132 The point has been made that these approaches might be “softer” in nature given the lesser level of 
violence exhibited by pandillas. ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 179. But see Rodgers, supra note 41, at 
6–7 (describing the nature of the pandillas as more representative of “youth gangsterism,” a distinction which 
potentially makes lessons learned from pandilla engagement more widely applicable outside of the region). 
 133 ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 162.  
 134 For example, following the implementation of hard line approaches, El Salvador’s “incarcerated 
population has doubled over the past five years.” Id. at 178; see also RODGERS ET AL., supra note 30, at 7 
(describing the crackdown following the Rodney King riots).  
 135 See ROCHA & RODGERS, supra note 30, at 178–79.  
 136 See MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO, supra note 114, at 38 (understanding the program 
as written). 
 137 This concept of transition in post-conflict settings comes about “as a result of generalized social conflict 
in which, among other factors, there is a plethora of violent agents,” a situation that Nicaragua is proactively 
combatting through preventative approaches in an attempt to promote non-recurrence. de Greiff, supra note 4, 
¶ 19, 20. 
 138 See Ley No. 872, supra note 4. 
 139 See id.  
 140 See generally Crime in Latin America, supra note 12; see also Tyler, supra note 81. 
 141 See MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO, supra note 114, at 38–39.  
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and the State.142 Within this context, the Department of Evaluation of Minors 
was established, whose stated mission was to rehabilitate adolescents rather than 
incarcerate them.143 In the second phase, the National Police placed the interest 
of the child first, undertaking programs that involved the participation of 
churches, local leaders, and family members, including them in the broader 
dialogue.144 This type of community involvement is demonstrative of the 
legitimacy conferred through meaningful partnership with the community.145 
These programs have been criticized as political instruments used to strengthen 
the current political leadership, necessitating the clarification of the line between 
political support and control.146 A metric related to community involvement 
divorced from this specter of political subterfuge is the public trust in police 
leadership given the personal tension between President Ortega and Director 
Granera.147 Director Granera sits atop the list of twenty-six Nicaraguan public 
officials with an approval rating of eighty-seven percent.148  
Social action groups in the United States have not conferred this level of 
legitimacy on their police forces, as evinced by their position that the 
“militarization of police departments further erodes the trust that should exist 
between residents and the police.”149 Director Granera credits her department’s 
multidisciplinary approach to policing for her success but emphasizes 
community involvement, not militarization, as its greatest strength.150 One 
department in which this community involvement is stressed is in the 
Department of Juvenile Justice.151  
 
 142 Id. at 38. 
 143 Specifically, this program sought to rehabilitate adolescents who suffered from addictions and had run-
ins with the law in order to “correct” behaviors rather than punish. See id.  
 144 See id.  
 145 This legitimacy can only be developed when it is the “fairness of police behavior–not the fear of police 
force and the threat of punishment–[that] creates legitimacy and through it drives public actions.” Tyler, supra 
note 81, at 2.  
 146 Peralta, supra note 118. 
 147 Stone, supra note 9 (describing political promotions, the current Director’s Sandinista ties, and 
WikiLeaks cables demonstrating political intrigue).  
 148 Johnson, supra note 116. 
 149 Turning Back the Tide: Promising Efforts to Demilitarize Police Departments, POL’Y LINK 
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Apr. 2015) https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55b673c0e4b0cf84699bdffb/t/ 
55b85c4fe4b044c6d34683d8/1438145615746/PL_BCC_DEMIL_POLICE_DEPT_04292015_rev.pdf.  
 150 Stone, supra note 9 (summarizing her model as one that is “preventative, proactive, communitarian, 
deeply rooted in the heart of the community”); see also Crime in Latin America, supra note 12 (pointing out the 
unique feature of the recruitment process, which requires community approval for each academy recruit, 
potentially serving as a driver for community engagement and buy-in).  
 151 See MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO supra note 114, at 39. 
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Through this community partnership, the National Police realized the value 
in continuing to shift its focus from reactive measures to preventative measures 
and educational outreach.152 Building on the second phase, which emphasizes 
youth involvement, phase three saw the modernization of the police force and 
the creation of the Juvenile Affairs Division, which focuses on the dynamics of 
violence aimed at understanding risk factors that would identify youths prone to 
violence and gang affiliation in order to rehabilitate them.153 The fourth phase 
culminated in 2004 with the introduction of the Drug Abuse Resistance 
Education Program (DARE) program as well as Nicaragua’s signature “No 
Violence Program.”154  
The preventative approach that was in place post-2004 utilizes a three-level 
continuum to rank youths according to risk levels before tailoring outreach 
programs to specific needs.155 Level 1 includes all youths who are given 
information that pertains to education and social interactions through outreach 
programs, like DARE.156 Level 2 includes juveniles struggling with drugs or 
violent behavior.157 Diagnostics and psychological help are sought for this 
group, with the hope that, along with familial support, problems can be 
addressed, allowing for the integration of the child as a contributing member of 
the community.158 Level 3 involves juveniles identified as participating in gang 
activity or having other criminal histories, which puts them in the highest risk 
category.159  
In response to this highest risk category, the Juvenile Affairs Division 
developed a holistic process informed by the Nicaraguan National Assembly’s 
promulgation of El Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, whose stated purpose 
is to put the interests of the adolescent first.160 In this endeavor, “community” is 
a term that pervades every step of the process.161 Through partnerships with the 
community, neighborhoods are reviewed in coordination with local 
stakeholders, and individuals are identified who fall into this highest risk 
 
 152 See id. at 38.  
 153 See id.  
 154 See id. 
 155 See id. at 40.  
 156 See id.  
 157 See id.  
 158 See id.  
 159 See id. 
 160 See id. This goal is also in keeping with the UN in Rights of the Child Convention. National Juvenile 
Justice Network [NJJN], supra note 130, at 2. 
 161 See generally MODELO POLICIAL COMUNITARIO PROACTIVO, supra note 114, at 39.  
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category.162 Once at-risk youth have been identified, they are not arrested; rather, 
their familial and community relationships are evaluated to produce a 
psychosocial assessment.163 This decision to first pursue rehabilitation in 
partnership with the community not only reinforces public perception of 
“fairness of police behavior” as opposed to “the fear of police force and the 
threat of punishment,” but also results in “legitimacy and through it drives public 
actions.”164 Integrative methods are then sought to involve the youth in 
community events while stressing the importance of social relationships.165  
Following this introductory vetting phase, the youth is offered a place at the 
national trade school in return for a pledge before his or her community to 
commit to non-violence.166 Upon graduation from this seven-track technical 
program, partner corporations employ the former gang members.167 This re-
integration into the community demonstrates a full cycle of a Juvenile Justice 
initiative, which is credited in large part for Nicaragua’s low violence statistics 
and the incarceration of a mere seventy youths in the entire country.168 While 
these numbers are impressive, criticism has ascribed success to manifold factors.  
Critics of the Nicaraguan system have posited that the decline in gang 
violence is “short term” and the efforts of government organizations and NGOs 
suffer from a lack of funding.169 This is a difficult concept to square with 
legislation codifying these principles in Nicaraguan law170 and the long-term 
statistics supporting the efficacy of the Nicaraguan model in spite of a lack of 
funding.171 This criticism would be better directed at other Latin American 
countries that all have chronically underfunded “crime prevention” bodies (as 
are their rehabilitation programs) but have not experienced the same drops in 
violence that Nicaragua has been able to achieve on a national level.172 While 
funding plays a role, political capital outside of Nicaragua has been spent on 
militarization rather than community-centered reforms.173  
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Other criticisms have ascribed Nicaragua’s enviable statistics not to any 
particularly successful program, but simply to institutional factors that 
distinguish it from its neighbors.174 Specifically, critics argue Nicaragua’s 
institutionalization of its National Police force was not hobbled by “elements of 
the old regime” and was able to evade “public accountability” resulting from 
“political agreements” in the Northern Triangle.175 Holdovers from prior 
regimes were able to exploit state institutions maintaining holds on the levers of 
power, perpetuating extralegal violence.176 This is a tenuous claim given the 
“highly-charged atmosphere of Nicaraguan politics.”177 The institutionalization 
and professionalization of the police force are the very reasons Nicaragua’s 
model should be exported to the United States. Further, the police force—
especially its leadership structure—has a degree of stability not present in the 
Northern Triangle, but which is endemic in the professionalized U.S. system.178 
There is, however, one glaring impediment to this analogy.  
The most difficult concept to square with democratic governance is a vestige 
of what can only be described as a Stasi-esque state security model. The 
Nicaraguan government has promulgated “Citizen Security” legislation that 
codifies the goals of the police force while empowering citizens.179 To this end, 
Social Prevention of Crime Committees have been formed along with Cabinets 
of Citizen Power, which “provide a direct link with the community.”180 While 
these types of programs have been criticized as having been “crafted as political 
tools,”181 the underlying concept is nonetheless laudable and further 
demonstrates a political commitment to reform. It would be naïve not to express 
concern, given the structure of the cabinets and the presidential link to the 
cabinet and the police force.182 However, the past three years have assuaged 
these fears, and the takeaway has shifted from the structure of the system to the 
intent behind it. This intent should be understood as involving the population in 
its own security system by integrating its engagement with the police force.  
While Nicaragua may not be able to export its neighborhood watch, political 
reform conducive to the underlying trust between the community and police 
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force presents an exportable community policing model aimed at combatting 
youth gang violence. It is political commitment to community involvement in 
restorative justice programs that promotes the public legitimacy that Nicaragua’s 
neighbors and the United States desperately need.  
While their neighbors have “pared down to little more than monthly 
meetings,”183 Nicaragua has focused its police force on “targeting the social 
conditions that cause” crime and developed “conditions which reduce it.”184 
Nicaragua and its neighbors are populated by an overwhelming percentage of 
citizens who recognize crime as a threat to their “[n]ation’s well-being.”185 
Rather than addressing fear through community policing, Northern Triangle 
countries implemented problem-oriented approaches that relied on military 
coordination.186 These approaches mirror the gang-unit approach undertaken by 
many U.S. jurisdictions, where the most commonly used measures are described 
by agencies as targeted patrols and specialized “gang units.”187 These techniques 
typically focus on suppression tactics, which were once the most prevalent tactic 
in the United States but were “frequently viewed as the least effective.”188 This 
method has remained popular not because of its effectiveness in local 
jurisdictions, but rather as a result of “mimetic processes” targeted at creating 
“institutional legitimacy,” rather than tailoring programs to “environmental 
contingencies.”189  
One of the most copied programs was that of the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD), whose Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums 
(CRASH) unit “became a national model.”190 While “community” figures 
prominently in the CRASH acronym, its operations were characterized by 
“decisively and aggressively” executed operations that, in a single year, yielded 
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upwards of 25,000 arrests for “the slightest infractions.”191 This mindset won 
national acclaim, yet a mere ten years later CRASH had been disbanded as 
scandals devastated community trust, making excessive force and extrajudicial 
enforcement become standard operating procedure.192 Short-term crime 
reductions were achieved through brutal tactics, whose unsustainable practices 
not only eroded public trust but also failed to achieve long-term reductions in 
youth gang violence.193 This is where Nicaragua’s experience is most useful 
when distinguished from its neighbors, where mimetic processes modeled after 
these hard-line U.S. techniques failed.194 Rather than short-term gains achieved 
through aggressive and abrasive tactics, Nicaragua focused on long-term 
outcomes through policing in partnership with the community.195 Further, when 
neighboring countries have engaged in piecemeal community policing, trials in 
smaller cities in Guatemala and El Salvador have been successful.196 Assuming 
adequate political support, this success has come despite their limited scope and 
funding, indicating the portability of some form of community model.197 
While the name or classification of the gang, along with percentages of 
violence attributable to gangs, may vary from country to country, governments 
should target the underlying fear through legislation fostering community 
policing. Problem-oriented policing addresses disorder resulting from crime, not 
fear.198 In the United States, this was best characterized in a survey of gang units 
that found that “underlying” issues were not in the officer’s purview, as the gang 
units saw their role as purely “reactive in nature—that they were to respond to 
real problems after they occurred.”199 Here, the emphasis on community 
involvement was simply gathering intelligence that would lead to the resolution 
of backward-looking investigations.200 Intelligence is a laudable and necessary 
first step, but simply applying it to backward-looking investigations not only 
fails to address the root cause of the violence but also limits its value. For 
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example, this limited value is seen in the feedback loop described by an 
Albuquerque police commander who described his gang unit’s community 
involvement as it related to intelligence gathering: “We know who they are and 
what they do, and we communicate with them. But we’re not going to change  
them . . . they basically say that they are a bad guy and you have got to catch 
me.”201 This department identified gang members and engaged with them, but 
the dialogue could only end in arrest and incarceration. Alternatively, the 
Nicaraguan approach envisions an outcome where the gang members can be 
reintegrated into their community as productive members of society.202 
This same underdeveloped community policing dynamic is seen in Dallas. 
The Dallas Police Department received a grant in 1996 to implement 
“Interactive Community Policing.”203 This initiative manifested itself in three 
main suppression tactics: “aggressive truancy enforcement,” “high visibility 
patrols,” and “stopping and frisking suspected gang members or other suspicious 
persons.”204 This approach does not engage the community in the vein of 
Nicaraguan partnership but demonstrates the varied application of the 
community concept.205 Given this wide gap between the U.S. and Nicaraguan 
models, a return to a conventional standard embodied by Nicaragua’s concept 
of “policing in partnership with the community,” codified through political 
commitment, presents a path to restorative rather than retributive justice.206  
Like most theories, the abstract appears straightforward, but the reality is 
more convoluted. The Nicaraguan methodology should not be duplicated. 
Instead, the intent behind the development of their practices should be 
considered in the implementation of community-oriented policing practices. 
Political commitment to reform aimed at codifying a community-focused 
approach has granted legitimacy in the eyes of the Nicaraguan population while 
effectively stifling youth gang violence.207 In the United States, officers have 
identified that “[t]he neighborhoods kind of need to protect themselves. I think 
that has given rise to some of the gang activity.”208 Given this sentiment, why 
not partner and provide an alternative collective security strategy?209 Policing in 
partnership has become a catchphrase worldwide, but in Nicaragua it has 
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become more than just a lofty ideal. It has been codified in legislation aimed at 
policing in partnership with the community.210 Reflecting on this development 
through the lens of transitional justice, the Director of Juvenile Affairs opined, 
“[t]he repression that we had during the 70s, taught us a lesson,” specifically 
“that when there is repression, there is a reaction.”211  
CONCLUSION 
In our globalizing world, transnational as well as inter-state gang problems 
will continue to proliferate. However, by focusing on local efforts and sharing 
best practices, agencies can learn from their peers and gain legitimacy through 
partnership with the community. No matter the number of arrests, the reality 
remains that this is not a zero-sum game. Conditions exist which give rise to 
these gangs, and only through proactive community engagement can they be 
addressed. No gang problem is the same and responses must be tailored to the 
individual communities.  
A first step has been taken in the United States where gang units gather 
information on gang activities.212 The information has been deployed in 
backward-looking investigations and gang harassment affected through 
suppression strategies.213 Building on these information-gathering techniques, 
the information gathered could be deployed in the vein of the holistic Nicaraguan 
approach, which engages youth gang members.214 Whether transnational, local, 
or inter-state, any juxtaposition of the aforementioned local engagement should 
begin at the community level. Local engagement with the community will not 
only enable more efficient intelligence gathering but will also create a 
relationship where the “fairness of police behavior—not the fear of police force 
and the threat of punishment—creates legitimacy and through it drives public 
actions.”215 This linkage enables police departments and local communities to 
address underlying causes of youth gang membership that are specific to their 
individual communities while realizing simultaneous gains in public perception 
through transparency, combatting the corrosion of “trust that should exist 
between residents and the police.”216  
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Reform does not always guarantee success. Indeed, there have been a 
number of failed efforts to implement community policing practices aimed at 
addressing gang violence.217 Nicaragua does not represent a silver bullet 
guaranteeing success in addressing youth gang violence, but its holistic approach 
enabled by political commitment to reform demonstrates the practice of 
theoretical precepts advanced in the United States.218 Building on these concepts 
of “community embeddedness, formal problem solving, and geographic 
accountability,” gang units will be both more effective and more legitimate.219 
Community policing should not refer to an abstract concept but should facilitate 
these models in practice through continuous community engagement, as 
demonstrated by Nicaraguan policies. While each iteration of community 
policing will be different, through continuous reform, undergirded by political 
commitment to reform, community partnership will combat drivers of youth 
gang violence. This co-production of security will result in communities in 
which local, transnational, or any hybrid thereof will be unable to find roots. 
While there may be a consensus at a “fundamental level” as to the nature of 
community policing, there are “factors contributing to the divergence of 
definition” which should attempt to channel Nicaragua’s approach, stressing: (1) 
political commitment to reform, (2) community involvement, (3) restorative 
justice through education and rehabilitation, and (4) public legitimacy.220 
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